Europe needs a «coalition of the willing»

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The year 2025 has already become a watershed moment for European security – another Zeitenwende in its own right. In less than three months, the second Trump administration has upended the precarious status quo shaped by the ongoing war in Ukraine. It has reversed previous US support for Kyiv, adopting a seemingly neutral (yet covertly pro-Russia) posture. The administration has also disrupted Washington’s relations with its allies through unilateral trade tariffs, hostile political rhetoric, and – most critically – threats of military disengagement from NATO and Europe altogether.

Faced with this «perfect storm» from across the Atlantic, European leaders have reacted with a series of formal and informal summits – in varying formations – that have focused primarily on boosting their own defense capabilities and keeping (and beefing) up support for Ukraine. On both fronts, the core intent has been to demonstrate collective resolve at a critical juncture while, at the same time, preparing for a declining American presence and involvement in European security.

Rearming Europe

So far, the most tangible outcome of these ongoing efforts has been the blueprint «Rearm Europe,» incorporated also in the White Paper titled «Defence Readiness 2030,» put forward in March by the European Commission and the External Action Service. In essence, the instrument, called SAFE (Security and Action for Europe), aims to mobilize up to 150 billion euros over 4 to 5 years – inter alia by repurposing unused funds from the EU budget for 2021 until 2027 – to provide all 27 member states affordable loans for extra investments in military capabilities. To foster transnational cooperation at the procurement and acquisition levels, such investments should involve more than one country, potentially including non-EU nations like Ukraine and Switzerland.

Perhaps most importantly, the legal basis for the new SAFE regulation lies in Article 122 of the EU treaty’s «national escape clause”. Governments will be permitted to increase national defense spending by up to 1,5 percent of GDP over the next four years without risking the excessive deficit procedure. If every single EU member did that much, the Commission has estimated that aggregated defense spending could grow by an extra 650 billion Euro for the period under consideration.

However, these will remain national decisions, as the EU, unlike NATO, has no agreed targets for defense expenditure. Moreover, not all member states may have the necessary fiscal capacity (considering debt levels and exposure to financial markets) or domestic political support to reach such spending levels. Countries like Italy, Spain, and even France may struggle to meet these targets – in contrast to Germany, which has amended its Basic Law to unlock unprecedented military funding. Meanwhile, other nations may not feel the same urgency that has propelled defence spending in the Baltic states and Poland. This is why consultations are still under way – including with non-EU countries like Great Britain, Norway, and Switzerland – to establish a dedicated financial vehicle (essentially a defence «bank») that could set further incentives for joint investment by mobilizing venture capital and outsourcing risks and costs.

All this, however, will also require a true Zeitenwende in how European countries manage their capability planning and procurement processes. This transformation is needed to overcome the current fragmentation and duplication, especially since single market rules don’t fully apply to this sector.

Preserving NATO

The «Trump card» will also have to be considered, as the administration’s NATO strategy remains unclear. To date, the main message coming from the White House has been about defense spending – about raising the previous national target of 2 percent of GDP well above 3 percent or even up to 5 percent. In the past, similar requests have often been accompanied by a friendly nudge to «buy American», which could undermine recent EU+ initiatives promoting European defense procurement and create divisions among allies. On top of that, uncertainty remains about the future of U.S. military presence and infrastructure in Europe.

As a result, the old idea of establishing a European «pillar» inside NATO – floated already in the 1990s, when a partial US withdrawal from a freer and more united Europe was already in the cards – has regained momentum. If agreed and properly implemented, such a pillar could maintain US involvement – albeit with a reduced burden–while preserving NATO’s crucial role as a «deterrent of last resort» against peer adversaries. It would also strengthen Europe’s operational (rather than strategic) autonomy. Even a more European and less American NATO, however, will require investing additional «blood and treasure» – for instance, significant human and financial resources – to give it more credibility while securing a degree of US involvement.

«27 − x + y»

Supporting Kyiv has become increasingly urgent, especially if Washington disengages. The EU and individual countries, both within and outside the Union, have intensified their efforts through increased macroeconomic funding and military assistance. The prospect of some sort of ceasefire brokered by Trump, however, has raised a crucial question: Who would monitor and safeguard its implementation– and how? London and Paris have taken the lead in addressing this challenge, including proposing to assemble and lead a «coalition of the willing» for deployment to Ukraine, preferably with some sort of US or NATO “backstop”. While the diplomatic and strategic context remains uncertain – so much so that the conditions for its actual deployment may not eventually materialize – such a coalition could become the first real test of European defence capabilities without American leadership.

Finally, similar to how European «rearmament» may be rolled out, such European «defence» may not be exclusively (or even primarily) EU-driven. Current treaties lack a mandate for «common defence,» containing only an enabling clause (article 42) that requires unanimous approval. Moreover, reforming EU treaties has become an almost impossible endeavour. Consequently, the formats that seem to be taking shape – thanks also to the rapprochement between Brussels and London prompted by the Trump presidency – can be expressed in algebraic terms as «27 − x + y» (where «x» represents unwilling or unable EU countries, and «y» represents interested non-EU ones). Paradoxically, the «variable geometry» that was once considered a device to undermine European integration may now become a tool to foster it.