The Language Police Do Not Help Minorities – On the Contrary

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Restrictions on freedom of speech and of the press are today frequently justified in the name of protecting minorities. Religious and ethnic groups, for example, are to be shielded from «hate», «offense», or «delegitimization». At first glance this seems noble. On closer inspection, however, a problem emerges. The claim to protection is directed less and less at concrete legal goods such as physical integrity or equal access, and increasingly at interpretive authority and taboo zones. It is precisely here that the tension with the idea of a liberal public sphere begins.

Tolerance means to endure. The concept refers to a fundamental practice of pluralistic societies: people must live with views they consider wrong, unpleasant, or even offensive. Yet anyone who demands protection from the opinions of others shifts this principle. Tolerance becomes a claim to insulation. The decisive question then is no longer whether a statement is true, well argued, or refutable, but whether it is perceived as «acceptable». This standard is politically flexible and group dependent, and therefore a poor foundation for freedom and for peaceful coexistence.

Moral pre-judgment

A look at the debates following the publication of the Mohammed cartoons in 2005 illustrates the ambivalence. At the time many Muslim voices demanded tighter limits on freedom of the press and of art in the name of respect for a religious minority. Years later, some of the same actors encounter limits when they comment on the Middle East conflict and their positions are classified as antisemitic or politically undesirable. This example is not suitable for schadenfreude but for a sober insight. Anyone who establishes restrictions as a legitimate response to offense accepts a logic that can later rebound against their own speech. Once introduced, such instruments rarely remain exclusive.

A second phenomenon adds to this: the conflation of people and ideas. Criticism of religion is often described as «Islamophobia» or «anti Muslim racism», as if it automatically involved racism. The boundary between criticism of a doctrine and the disparagement of persons becomes blurred. This can disarm criticism and shorten debates. Conversely, a mirror image tendency also exists. In Jewish debates, criticism of Israel is sometimes quickly labeled antisemitic. Here too a reflex arises that morally predetermines the discussion instead of conducting it through arguments. Both mechanisms have the same effect. They render certain statements not refutable but unsayable.

The legal philosopher Frauke Rostalski describes in her book «Die vulnerable Gesellschaft» a development that encourages this process. Social groups increasingly present themselves as protective collectives. They expect the state not only to safeguard their civil rights but also to protect their interpretations and sensitivities. Conflict thus shifts from public dispute into legal and administrative procedures. Those who feel offended no longer seek the better argument but the better paragraph of law.

For courts this is a burden, because they must judge meanings and contexts rather than actions. It is also damaging for the public sphere, because the corridor of acceptable discourse narrows as people begin to anticipate what might later be interpreted as «problematic». This accelerates the fragmentation of society instead of establishing a common ground. Out of fear of saying something «wrong», people retreat into their own group and come to view other groups as threats to their identity.

Demands outward, repression inward

Another blind spot concerns religious minorities themselves. They often hold an ambivalent attitude toward freedom. In relation to the majority society, they invoke tolerance and the rule of law to secure their religious practice. Within their own communities, however, individual freedoms are not infrequently restricted, especially regarding women’s rights, sexual self-determination, and the upbringing of children. This is often overlooked in public debate. Left liberal identity politics concentrates on discrimination from outside and ignores power relations within communities. Yet this too is a question of freedom of speech. Anyone who cannot speak freely within their own community possesses formal rights but no real voice.

A paradoxical pattern emerges. Members of minorities demand recognition, respect, and protection from the majority society, while rarely addressing abuses within their own milieu in public, often out of loyalty, dependence, or fear of sanctions. Those who experience little room for dissent at home seek it elsewhere. They shift protest outward because inward dissent would be costly.

Left liberal milieus and a widespread sense of majority guilt reinforce this trend. Minorities increasingly appear as representatives of a collective rather than as individuals. Muslim women therefore take to the streets for the right to wear a headscarf but do not demonstrate against forced marriages, honour killings, or the genital mutilation of young girls. Recognition replaces emancipation.

The language of labels contributes to this dynamic. Terms such as islamophobic, antisemitic, homophobic, or transphobic are important for naming real discrimination. They lose analytical value, however, when they are used as weapons of discourse to delegitimize criticism wholesale. In the end the main beneficiaries are those who have learned to convert outrage into political or media attention. This does little for social integration. For freedom of speech it has clear consequences.

Protect citizens, not worldviews

A liberal society therefore requires a clear distinction. Protection from violence, protection from discrimination in the legal sense, and protection from calls for concrete harm, yes. Protection from criticism, satire, provocation, or political discomfort, no. Anyone who takes tolerance seriously accepts that conflicts must be fought out in public. The state should safeguard civil rights, not worldviews. The decisive question is therefore not how to limit as many unpleasant opinions as possible, but how to live with harsh opinions without descending into hostility: through counter speech, through better arguments, through clear rules against violence and defamation, and through the ability to endure difference. A public sphere that can no longer do this loses maturity. It does not become more just, only more sensitive.